The widespread ennoblement of the Spanish bourgeoisie in the sixteenth century has been traditionally considered one of the main causes of Iberian decline. I document and quantify the surge in ennoblement through a new time series of nobility cases preserved in the Archive of the Royal Chancery Court of Valladolid and use the insights provided by lawsuits from several localities to model the rent seeking mechanisms at work in a game theoretical framework. I then validate the game against the data and use it to draw inferences about the unobserved redistributive activity in local politics. Contrary to established scholarship, I find that: 1) the tax exemptions granted to nobles cannot alone explain the flight to privilege, since ennoblement was more costly than the present value of the future tax benefits; 2) the central motivation behind ennoblement was to gain control of local governments and acquire decision-making power over common resources; 3) while ennoblement reflected a high level of redistributive activity, there is no evidence in the archival record linking it to the stagnation and decline of Spain.
Introduction.
The stagnation and decline of Spain during the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries remains one of the quintessential topics in the economic history of Modern Europe.
1 While the literature has gradually moved to emphasize the role played by institutions, it has mostly stopped short of a detailed primary-source based analysis of the institutional structures that are normally identified as the main hold-ups on Spanish economic growth, such as the monarchy, the nobility, the trade, craft and shepherd guilds, and the Catholic Church. The improved access and cataloguing of the vast archival resources on Early Modern Spain offer now a unique opportunity to apply what Greif (2005) terms "the empirical method of institutional analysis" to this timeless problem.
As part of a wider research agenda on the institutional foundations of Early Modern Spain, this paper takes a close look at the Castilian lower nobility, the hidalgos of Don Quixote fame, on whom scholars of the calibre of Carlo Cipolla, Fernand Braudel, J. H. Elliott, and David Landes among others have squarely placed the blame of spreading a mentality of idleness and a disdain for manual labour. 2 The number of petty nobles, who were exempt from royal taxes and enjoyed several legal and social privileges, is widely believed to have rapidly grown during the sixteenth century in response to the increasing fiscal pressure of the Habsburg monarchs and to a general aspiration to live a "noble life." Since hidalgos were technically impeded from engaging in trade and industry, and since all their legitimate male sons inherited the title in perpetuity, the foregone conclusion is that such a social migration resulted in a large misallocation of talent. Braudel saw 1 Major works on Early Modern Spain have continued to appear at a sustained rate in the last decade. For just three very recent influential examples, see Marcos Martín (2000) , Kamen (2003) and Yun (2004) . For an institutionalist treatment of the Spanish case within a wider European context, see North and Thomas (1973) and Acemoglu et al. (2004) .
3 in the flight to nobility the failure to fulfil a historical duty to nurse the seeds of capitalism to full maturity, and scornfully christened it "the treason of the bourgeoisie." 3 This traditional interpretation suggests obvious links with the literature on the allocation of talent in the style of Baumol (1990) and Murphy et al. (1991) , which argues that the inefficient allocation of human capital in rent seeking environments might have a stifling effect on economic growth. The archival record is nonetheless silent on the degree of compliance of hidalgos with the legal restrictions on their economic activity; what little indirect evidence there is suggests that violations were generalized, while no attempts to enforce compliance are present in the data.
Contrary to the widespread belief that large numbers of hidalguías were sold by the Crown, the almost exclusive gateway into the lower nobility in the sixteenth century was litigation in one of the two Royal Chancery Courts of the kingdom. The holdings of the Archivo de la Real Chancillería de Valladolid, well known to genealogists but barely exploited by social scientists, are a treasure trove for the study of hidalguía. In a first attempt to characterize the temporal evolution of the institution, I have compiled a time series of the surviving 42,313 cases filed with the Valladolid Chancery Court, which had jurisdiction over the northern half of Castile. The series, which extends between 1490 and 1834, shows a large increase in legal activity in the midsixteenth century, thus confirming the impression that the pace of ennoblement was fastest during that period.
While cold to the treason of the bourgeoisie argument, a careful examination of the archival record points to a different and more compelling rent-seeking scenario. I start by challenging the conventional wisdom that placed tax exemptions at the centre for of the quest for nobility while ignoring or summarily treating the remaining entitlements of hidalgos. By matching lawsuit 4 costs to tax data I show that the fiscal benefits of ennoblement could not have justified its cost.
The evidence points instead to the acquisition of municipal offices and the control over common resources that came with them as the main reason -the "central transaction" in Greif's termsbehind the quest for nobility. 4 Such a finding frames the hidalgo problem as an eminently local issue and places it firmly into the rent seeking literature, which has made surprisingly little foray into the study of Spanish institutions.
5
I then trace a distinction between nobility lawsuits, which commoners used to attain noble status, and distributive lawsuits, which existing hidalgos used to wrestle control of municipal offices from incumbent commoners. Following Greif's interactive empirical approach, I model the redistribution and ennoblement mechanisms in a game theoretical setting, using the information from legal documents to characterize players, actions and payoffs, and I validate it by testing its implications for the temporal pattern of litigation against the series of distributive and ennoblement lawsuits. I finally consider the efficiency costs of redistributive and ennoblement activities identified by archival documents. In the towns that experienced high levels of litigation the deadweight losses generated by conflict itself were large enough to cripple local economies and forestall their possibilities of growth. 6 The model suggests that most of the time, however, litigation was an off-the-equilibrium-path action, as players learnt from the experiences of neighboring towns, updating their beliefs about the functioning of the courts and avoiding strategies that would have resulted in expensive legal battles. 7 This finding suggests that the data 4 Greif (2005) . Only a manuscript was available to me at the time of writing, and hence pagination is not cited.
5 See Ekelund and Tollison (1997) for an example mostly focused on the Mesta.
6 A substantial literatutre exists on the relationship between rent seeking and economic growth; see Murphy et al. (1993) , DeLong and Shleifer (1993) , Tornell and Lane (1999) .
7 For a similar model where rent seeking can occur while open conflict remains off the equilibrium path see González (2005) .
presented here reflect just the tip of the large iceberg of redistribution from commoners towards the petty nobility in Early Modern Castile. Such redistributive activity would nonetheless have taken place while mostly avoiding costly litigation, leaving no solid case linking it to supposed inefficiencies in the allocation of resources and human capital. Hidalgos may have been resented by the commoners they displaced from town governments and loathed by eighteenth and nineteenth century liberal reformers; they are, however, unlikely culprits in the puzzle of the decline of Spain.
The nature and evolution of hidalguía.
Hidalgos: the Sons of Something.
The very word hidalgo embodies the nature of those who wore the title with pride; while even its origin has been unable to escape dispute, the most commonly accepted etymology is hijo de algo, literally "son of something" (where "something" means "someone of value"). The oldest hidalgo families claimed to be able to trace their origins to the Visigothic lineages of the days before the Muslim invasion of the peninsula in 711 A.D., and to have achieved their status through distinguished military service to the monarchs of the northern kingdoms in the course of the Reconquista. During the Middle Ages, hidalgos were in fact expected to maintain weapons and a horse, and to join the king's army whenever called to war; in return, they were granted special privileges, foremost among which the exemption from royal and municipal taxes.
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8 Hidalguía, in its most open meaning, is synonym with nobility; all Spanish nobles, including grandees and títulos (dukes, marquises, counts and viscounts), were technically hidalgos. I am not concerned with those upper echelons, and will therefore use the word in its narrow sense, designating the lower nobility that, while always striving to climb the ranks of society, was just one step above the plain commoner. For a thorough discussion of the structure of the Spanish nobility see Domínguez Ortiz (1985) . For an excellent historical survey on the several social strata that gradually converged into Early Modern hidalgos, see Díaz de la Guardia (2005) , chapters 1-4.
While tax exemptions were the most transparent and visible attribute of hidalgo status, they were not always the most valuable one. 9 Direct taxes were no longer a significant burden in the first half of the sixteenth century, and in many towns they were even assessed on a capitation basis, making them virtually negligible for the rich. Hidalgos, however, also enjoyed preferential access to municipal offices under the system called mitad de los oficios, which reserved half of the top positions in the local government for them. 10 Their privileges under criminal law were paramount: they could not be tortured, flogged or exposed to public shame; if jailed, they had to be kept separate from the commoners; they could not be sent to the galleys, and, if sentenced to death, they had the right to be beheaded rather than hanged. Perhaps their most valuable immunity on a practical basis was the exemption from prison by reason of debt. That hidalgos were entitled by law to enjoy all these privileges, however, does not mean that local authorities always bowed to them. I shall return to this important point later on.
A much debated attribute of hidalguía is its theoretical incompatibility with the so-called "mechanical" and "vile" professions, virtually any occupation that involved manual work, together with tax collection (but not tax farming) and a few other outcast activities. 11 The increase in the number of hidalgos in the sixteenth century has been repeatedly singled out as one of the reasons behind the decline of Castile, as more and more successful merchants and traders supposedly abandoned their activities to live off the rents of the land or of tax farms.
Clearly such a prohibition was not universally enforced, as it would have been a practical 9 So indissoluble were hidalgo status and the exemption from royal and municipal pechos that someone who did not pay them and remained unchallenged would in time be recognized as an hidalgo, while paying them at any point without protest would jeopardize any chances of affirming an hidalguía. Such identity is again etched into the language: the Spanish word for a commoner is pechero, someone who pays direct taxes. See Thompson (1987) for a discussion on the language of class distinction in Spain.
7 impossibility for everyone to abstain from manual work in areas that enjoyed universal hidalguía. 12 The concern still remains that those who attained hidalgo status during the sixteenth century could have been more zealous in keeping to the legal requirements of nobility in a bid to affirm their newly achieved social rank.
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It has long been contended that the number of hidalgos swelled in the sixteenth century, but the dynamics, magnitude and significance of this phenomenon have not been the subject of a thorough scholarly discussion so far. A very common misconception is that the increase in the hidalgo ranks was the result of massive sales of letters of privilege on the part of the Crown during the reigns of Charles V and Philip II; the myth has continued to surface every now and then, even in the face of Thompson's categorical refutation. 14 Sales of hidalguías were indeed an extremely rare occurrence as a result of the nature of the privilege itself. 
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The lawsuit of hidalguía.
When an hidalguía was challenged, usually by a town council that tried to collect direct taxes from its holder, the individual claiming to be an hidalgo could only affirm his status by suing the town in one of the two Royal Chancery Courts of Castile, which resided at Valladolid and Granada. The Chancery Courts (chancillerías) were the highest tribunals in the kingdom short of the Royal Council, and, from the fifteenth century onwards, had exclusive jurisdiction in all cases concerning the dispute of an hidalguía, which were heard by a special chamber called the
Sala de Hijosdalgo.
16 To distinguish them from the "distributive lawsuits" described in the next section, I shall refer to lawsuits of hidalguía "nobility" or "ennoblement" lawsuits.
To win a lawsuit, a claimant of hidalguía would have to prove, at a minimum, that his father and grandfather had been hidalgos, widely reputed as such in the places where they had lived. He had therefore to produce witnesses that had known (or claimed to have known) his father and grandfather, and could confirm their status. The town council, together with the king's prosecutor (who intervened ex-officio in all lawsuits of hidalguía), would try to show that the claimant or his ancestors were not hidalgos, presenting evidence that they had paid direct taxes or had not enjoyed certain criminal or legal privileges. Alternatively, they could try to find one or more impediments to their hidalguía, such as being illegitimate sons or having Jewish ancestry.
17
16 The mandatory source for the structure and operation of the Sala de Hijosdalgo is Martín Postigo and Domínguez Rodríguez (1990) , on which virtually all my references on the functioning of the chamber are based. A thorough historical and juridical treatment of the lawsuit of hidalguía can be found in Díaz de la Guardia (2005), chapter 3.2.
17 As a result, the prosecution often presented very colorful stories. The lawsuit of St. Theresa's father contains a copy of the Inquisition proceedings that documented how his grandfather had converted from Judaism and had been forced to wear the shameful robe of the conversos for two months [Ejido (1986) ]. In the lawsuit of Benito de Caldas in 1544 witnesses for the prosecution testified that his grandfather had been held in a common jail and sentenced to lashes for petty theft (SHP 68.3) . In the lawsuit of Alonso de Melgar in 1556, in a standard contention, the prosecutor alleged that he was the son of "plain commoners, converted Jews, adulterous and incestuous" (SHP 871.8 better term, I shall hereafter call "deposition"). The town and the king's prosecutor normally did not intervene in the process and the document was not enforceable by itself; it could, however, be used as evidence in lawsuits, and therefore its existence could conceivably deter future legal challenges. Another possibility was to request a royal provision from the court, which certified the "known status" of its holder. The town and the king's prosecutor normally opposed the claim of hidalguía in the legal proceedings (called expedientes provisionales, translated here as "provisional files"), which, although reminiscent of lawsuits, were simpler, faster and cheaper.
They did not result in a carta ejecutoria, though, which remained the only enforceable (SHP 351.3) . Melgar lost his case, but all the others were able to have their hidalguías confirmed despite the obvious impediments. Valladolid court, and hence to its geographical jurisdiction north of the river Tagus (roughly the northern half of Spain). classified according to whether a carta ejecutoria was issued in the case or not; if a carta ejecutoria exists (and hence the hidalguía was confirmed), the lawsuit is said to be "defunct"
(fenecido). 21 Otherwise, the lawsuit is called "forgotten" (olvidado). Depositions, provisional files and unclassified papers are also shown. The number of defunct lawsuits is not an exact reflection of the increase in the number of hidalgo families. A substantial number of forgotten lawsuits also confirm the hidalguía; it is possible that the claimant, having settled his position within the town, did not request a carta ejecutoria to avoid further expenses. On the other hand, some lawsuits were filed by legitimate claimants whose rights were being infringed; favourable sentences in such cases did not increase the number of hidalgos (although unfavourable ones might have reduced it). Finally, it is important to keep in mind that legal proceedings only capture situations of conflict; if someone declared himself an hidalgo and no one challenged him, after a few years he would most likely be reputed as such without the need of a lawsuit. As a speaker in the Cortes of 1624 put it:
The officials of the towns and villages will not dare list anyone in the tax tolls who is prepared to go to litigation, however well known a commoner he is. Thus he is left exempted as if he were an hidalgo, and so becomes one. Contrariwise, if they list an hidalgo who is poor, he cannot litigate and loses his hidalguía. 23
The shape of the distribution is nonetheless consistent with contemporary and historiographical accounts of the swelling of the ranks of hidalgos in the sixteenth century.
22 See Díaz de la Guardia (2005), pp. 449-450. 23 Quoted in Thompson (1987) , p. 26.
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A glimpse on the composition of Northern Castilian society.
The only relatively firm observation on the number of hidalgos in sixteenth-century Spain is the census of households taken in 1542, which revealed that 108,358 out of 897,130 households in the Crown of Castile, about 12% of the total, enjoyed noble status. 24 The global figure, however, yields little information about the regional variation in the distribution of hidalgos, as well as no insight into the finer distinctions within the noble and commoner ranks.
A rare 1530 tax roll from the town of Briones, in modern-day La Rioja, can provide some additional insight into the matter. This document lists the individual assessments of a direct royal tax (moneda forera), which the village paid to the Crown every six years. Unlike most rolls that only list commoners (called "pecheros" after the name of the taxes they paid, the pechos), this particular one lists hidalgos as well, further breaking down their status into "notable" hidalgos (i.e. those whose status no one would dare question), those who had obtained the title by royal privilege, and those who were in possession of a carta ejecutoria, all of them duly entered with a zero tax liability. It also identifies "dubious" hidalgos, who were assessed taxes as plain taxpayers, but by being listed as such preserved the right to litigate in the future. Nadal (2001) , p. 41. A household corresponded to roughly 5 inhabitants, which puts the population of Castile in 1542 at about four and half million. Excluded from this are the roughly 100,000 households of the Crown of Aragon, which had a different nobility structure. See Artola (1993), vol. 6, p. 589. 25 As discussed later in the paper, my attention was drawn to Briones because of the elevated number of "distributive" lawsuits emanating from this town. That this peculiar tax roll was compiled might well be a result of such litigation. However, in the over 350 individual cases I have manually examined, I have not come across another tax roll that provides a similar breakdown of the population by social standing. Even at the early date of 1530, this northern community of approximately 2,500 inhabitants already had 34.42% of hidalgo households, with 13.65% more claiming to be such while still paying taxes. Of the 169 hidalgo households, only one had won its status in the courts, while three had attained it by royal privilege, either bought or conferred. Hidalgos were twice as likely as pecheros to leave behind widows and orphans; this might possibly reflect the disincentive of hidalgo widows to marry to anyone but another hidalgo, as they would have otherwise lost their noble status. Finally, 28 taxpayer households were exempted from taxes by reason of extreme poverty; their breakdown was 20 pecheros, 2 dubious hidalgos, 3 widows of pecheros and 3 pechero women. These figures imply a 9.3% poverty rate among taxpayer households. Since the tax was assessed on a capitation basis, it is not possible to use these data to draw further inference about the wealth distribution of the town.
The nobility lawsuits described in this section all reflect individual bids for hidalguía, and constitute only the first piece of the rent-seeking puzzle in Early Modern Castile. The next section studies a different kind of legal proceeding which hidalgos and pecheros used to jostle for the control of towns and the distribution of the fiscal burden.
Distributive conflict
During the Middle Ages, towns and cities enjoyed an extraordinary degree of autonomy that, together with specific prerogatives and tailor-made legal codes (fueros), had been granted by the Crown as way of securing widespread support in the war against the Arab kingdoms. Town councils were usually dominated by a commoner elite, which freely ignored the privileges of hidalgos, blocking them from access to public office, taxing them, and even banning them from living in their jurisdiction altogether. While such actions were contrary to noble privilege, the concerns of hidalgos were normally shrugged off by the pechero-dominated councils, and any royal rulings favourable to hidalgos were dutifully acknowledged and promptly ignored. 26 After the unification of Spain in 1492, with the Arab threat gone and the larger demands of Early Modern European policy and warfare pressing on its coffers, the monarchy moved to impose a stronger grip on towns, projecting its power through tribunals, marshals and, as in the case of the revolt of the Comunidades, full armies if needed. 27 Hidalgos soon took advantaged of the newly found strength of royal courts to reclaim their long ignored privileges, demanding access to the government of their towns and trying to shift the tax burden towards commoners.
Two perennial issues of contention between hidalgos and pecheros were the allocation of local government posts and the use of town revenues. An old unwritten custom, often toyed with by the Cortes and respected by the courts but never written into hard law, established that hidalgos and pecheros should split evenly the available positions in local government; since pecheros were normally much more numerous, the system, known as mitad de los oficios (literally "half the offices"), gave enormous influence to hidalgos, although it was rarely enforced before the sixteenth century.
28
Castilian cities were also richly endowed with a particular kind of communal goods called propios; unlike proper commons, a local government could enclose or otherwise grant the exclusive use of propios to a private party in exchange for a monetary payment. Just as they had bestowed a large degree of autonomy on Castilian towns during the Reconquista, Medieval monarchs had also generously granted them propios as way of attracting settlers to the newly recovered lands. 29 Pecheros in the city government usually tried to use the revenue generated by propios to pay the royal taxes allocated to the city and to defray the cost of lawsuits of hidalguía.
These moves were vigorously contested by hidalgos, legitimate ones and self-avowed alike.
Established hidalgos didn't want to see their share in the common revenues used to pay for a tax they were exempt from; claimants of hidalguía naturally opposed the use of communal revenue in which they had a stake to fight lawsuits against them.
The key document to the analysis of distributive conflict is a particular kind of lawsuit in which hidalgos and pecheros took part as collective units (estados). For lack of a better word, I use the 28 On the system of mitad de los oficios see Díaz de la Guardia (2005) and Domínguez Ortiz (1985) , p. 129. 29 On propios see Artola (1993), vol. 5, pp. 981-83. 17 term "distributive" to refer to these lawsuits (as opposed to the individual "nobility" lawsuits described in the previous section). Figure 2 shows their temporal distribution. Distributive lawsuits follow a similar progression to that of lawsuits proper during the life of the Chancery Court, peaking in the late sixteenth century and then declining to about half their peak 30 I define distributive lawsuits as those in which one of the parties is formed by hidalgos as a collective, and the other by pecheros. I also allow either hidalgos or pecheros to be replaced by village authorities, such as alcaldes, regidores or justicia. The search strings used on the database of the archive were: the hidalgos, the state of the hijosdalgo, those who call themselves hidalgos, hidalgo neighbors, the officers of the hijosdalgo, the pecheros, the state of the pecheros, pechero neighbours, the mayor, the council, the justice.
31 These lawsuits were heard by both the Sala de Hijosdalgo and the four civil chambers of the Royal Chancery Courts. The civil chambers were served by twelve secretaries (escribanos), but only the lawsuits held by two of them were fully catalogued by the archive at the time of writing (Fernando Alonso and Pérez Alonso). However, since cases were assigned on a strictly random basis to the different secretaries, the catalogued ones can be safely taken to be a one-sixth random sample of the population. To estimate the total number, I multiplied the catalogued cases from the civil chambers by six, and added the cases from the Sala de Hijosdalgo (which is fully catalogued). For a description of the random assignment mechanism to the secretaries, see Aulestia (1667) The hidalgos of Medina de Pomar, a medium-sized town in the jurisdiction of Burgos, won a ruling in 1553 preventing the council from paying royal taxes out of propios revenue, and granting them half of the town's offices. 32 The commoners fought back, arguing that in the city there had never been a distinction between hidalgos and pecheros (which should be taken to mean that pecheros never respected the privileges of the few hidalgos) and denouncing that many commoners were taking advantage of the situation to call themselves hidalgos, thus producing a sharp increase in nobility lawsuits filed against the town. The court nonetheless sided with the nobles, confirming their right to half of the town's positions and ruling that legal expenses had to be paid out of direct taxes assessed on commoners.
Distributive litigation was often followed by a flurry of ennoblement lawsuits, as commoners that had formerly been excluded from the town government tried to jump into the hidalgo camp to gain political access, or as incumbents tried to hold onto their control over the town by seeking ennoblement themselves. 
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The combination of nobility and distributive litigation was a heavy burden on the town's finances, and by the end of the 1550s Medina de Pomar found itself effectively unable to continue defending the massive amount of lawsuits it faced; its common resources were depleted, and its social and political structure was radically altered as well.
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In Briones the distributive conflict dragged on longer and, in a significant difference, the town was allowed to cover legal expenses out of propios revenue at least until 1571, despite vigorous opposition from the hidalgos. 35 The protracted battle was taking its toll, though, and by 1570 the town already owed over 50,000 maravedíes in legal expenses and had resorted to authorizing the logging of an entire woodland, a precious resource in barren Castile, to raise an additional 15,000. Attorneys for the town also reported that many lawsuits had to be dropped for lack of funds. 36 From a 1572 filing, we learn that the town had incurred large debts with private residents to keep the wheels of the Chancery Court spinning. 37 The document also reports that, in the rush to raise money, many propios had been leased for less than half the amount they would have normally fetched (although malfeasance on the part of town officials was also suggested). 
The subjects, motives and timing of ennoblement.
I now return to the questions of who sought ennoblement, why did they seek it, and what motivated their timing, and address them using the records of the abundant nobility litigation of Medina de Pomar. The choice of this town was entirely dictated by the availability of quality data; in order to identify the socio-economic extraction of litigants and their success rates, I need 38 SHP 1632.1. Since in many places appointments to public office could not be refused under penalty of prison, commoners hoped to place hidalgos in the dilemma of declining to serve, thus breaking the law, or accepting offices incompatible with nobility. The mandatory character of public service was often used to punish one's enemies; in 1654, for example, Luis de Vega was appointed by the mayor of the town of Valderas, in the jurisdiction of León, as a collector of the excise on wine. Being illiterate, de Vega could not hope to discharge his duty in any meaningful way, but he was nonetheless imprisoned for refusing it. He then appealed to the Royal Chancery Court, claiming that, being an hidalgo, he was nonetheless exempt from acting as a tax collector. See SHP 1982.9. 39 The distributive conflict in the Hermandad 
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to match them to at least two different tax rolls several years apart. Portions of tax rolls were sometimes filed by towns to show that a claimant of hidalguía had paid taxes in the past; complete tax rolls, though, are a rarity, and only for Medina de Pomar was I able to find two of them within a meaningful period. In all other respects, however, Medina de Pomar is an average Castilian town, and its pattern of litigation is found repeatedly throughout Castile. The distribution of nobility lawsuits involving its residents is shown in Figure 3 . In this town there has never been a difference between hidalgos and pecheros because all the pechos (direct royal taxes paid by the town to the Crown) were always paid from the common bourse until one and a half years ago, when it was ordered that they should not be paid from that bourse.
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In another document related to the same dispute, several witnesses were asked how many households were there in the town, and how many of them were headed by hidalgos. All but one of them reported that the town counted about 300 households (roughly 1500 inhabitants), of which no more than 3 or 4 were from hidalgo lineages; the last witness put the numbers at 350 households and 6 or 7 hidalgo ones. 41 Immediately after the distributive lawsuit allocated half the offices to nobles and reinstituted direct taxation about 20% of the population of Medina de Pomar claimed hidalguía, and the town found itself in the uncomfortable position of having to defend over sixty lawsuits with limited resources. As it will become clear, the ex-post optimal decision might well have been not to fight back; at the time, those in power decided to do otherwise.
Matching litigants to tax rolls.
The opening salvo in the battle of Medina de Pomar was a request filed in 1554, asking the Royal Chancery Court to authorize a special contribution of 15,000 maravedíes to pay for the several lawsuits it had to fight. Despite the vigorous opposition of those claiming to be hidalgos, the Chancery Court granted the request, with the added provision that all those who were not in firm possession of an hidalguía should be included in the assessment. 42 Since by the time of the special contribution of 1554 no lawsuit filed that year had yet come to a close, and since 40 SHP 828.2. In a similar case, we learn that the small town of Villalobos, in the jurisdiction of Montes de Oca, was also free of direct taxes until 1540. See SHP 679.1.
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individual contributions were determined in rough proportion to individual wealth, the tax roll that was drawn as a result is an excellent tool to determine the socio-economic extraction of those who filed for hidalguía. Pomar did not list neighbours without any tax liability, and so the meaning of "success" needs to be qualified; while winning an ejecutoria would certainly make someone a successful litigant by this measure, so would dying, becoming poor or relocating to a different town (as well as being missed in the matching exercise). Unsuccessful litigants, on the other hand, are a sharp lower bound on the ability of the town to keep claimants of hidalguía within its tax rolls. 43 The 1554 tax roll is found in PP 68.5. While the general rule was that richer people should receive a higher assessment, the tax assessor, who was appointed by the town council, had a large degree of discretion in determining individual tax bills. Since the situation was being closely monitored and there were no cries of outrage over unfair assessments, it does not seem unreasonable to assume that the rule was largely observed.
For the purposes of the 1554 extraordinary tax, the population of the town was divided into 8 brackets; at the lower end, people were taxed in increments of half a real (1 real = 34 maravedíes). After the 2 reales bracket, tax liability was assessed in increments of one real, with a maximum of six reales. A total of 257 households were assessed; the remaining ones would have been hidalgo, poor, or might have been exempted for other reasons. If the poverty rate had been similar to the 9.3% observed in Briones, these numbers would be strongly consistent with the witness accounts that put the population of the town at about 300 households, of which between 3 and 7 would have been hidalgo. Overall, slightly over 16,000 maravedíes of tax liability were assessed; while this exceeded the 15,000 authorized by the court, the extra amount was probably meant to compensate for potential non-payers. Figure 4 shows the distribution of the tax liability that emerges from the 1554 tax roll, further broken down by the litigant status of the household. The implied distribution of wealth has a very plausible shape; the 1562 tax roll suggests an even more skewed distribution, since some of the households that were assessed at the maximum of six reales in 1554 were even further to the right when the total tax bill allowed for it.
44
44 Since the court had allowed the town to assess anyone without an ejecutoria for the purposes of the 1554 extraordinary contribution, town officials might have wanted to tax as many households as possible as a way to strengthen the case for denying them hidalgo status. As a consequence, the tax bill of the richer households might have been kept artificially low to ensure that every taxable household in the lower wealth brackets was assessed at least some tax, while not exceeding the maximum revenue allowed by the court.
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Figure 4: Distribution of tax liability by litigants -Medina de Pomar, 1554.
Compiled from the catalogue of the Archivo de la Real Chancillería de Valladolid and the tax rolls for the years 1554 (PP 68.5) and 1562 (PP 68.6).
The above data allow to examine the town's strategy for fighting the avalanche of lawsuits. At first glance, the introduction of direct taxation seems to explain fairly well the timing of the litigation emanating from Medina de Pomar, as well as that of several other localities, and is entirely consistent with the focus on tax exemptions that traditional scholarship has used to explain the increase in the ranks of hidalgos. The main problem with this theory, however, is that 27 the value of direct taxes was not nearly high enough to justify by itself the trouble and expense involved in acquiring an hidalguía through the judicial route. In Briones, for example, the wealthiest commoners paid less than 300 maravedíes per year in royal taxes in 1568. 45 In Medina de Pomar, with the exception of one person who paid 1,200 maravedíes, no one was assessed over 375 maravedíes in 1580. 46 Such sums were equivalent to about a week of an urban labourer's wages, a sum that, as the following analysis shows, could not justify the cost of a lawsuit of hidalguía even under the most favourable assumptions.
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The returns to ennoblement.
Obtaining a precise estimate of the total cost of a lawsuit is an arduous task, as no clear information survives in this respect. A 1570 estimate by a royal auditor put the cost of the average lawsuit at 24,000 maravedíes, while Kagan (1981) , using evidence from civil cases, reached a very similar figure. 48 I have not found any lawsuit of hidalguía containing such detail, and have had to rely on the 16 cases from Medina de Pomar that report partial expenses. The information yielded by them is nonetheless consistent with Kagan's estimate. We learn, for example, that the city spent an average 5,016 maravedíes in deposing witnesses and filing motions alone. Other court fees, attorney fees and reimbursement of expenses would have easily doubled that figure. In one of the cases, the council was sentenced to reimburse the costs of Francisco Barbero, whose claim had been successful, in the amount of 9,000 maravedíes. 49 That 45 PP 37.13.
46 PP 68.6. The person who received a 1,200 maravedíes assessment was Juan del Campo, who had sued the town for an hidalguía in 1554, but lost. His lawsuit is SHP 424.4. 47 Labourer wages for the relevant years in Old Castile are available in Hamilton (1934) . In 1568 they were 68 mrs. per day, while in 1580 they were 60 mrs. per day.
48 Kagan (1981) , p. 39. 49 These costs are reported in a loose paper, SHP 1923.1, containing a 1556 legal filing against the mayor of the town, who was refusing to levy a special contribution to pay the judgment. The lawsuit in question is SHP 743.7.
figure still did not include the fee for the issuance of the carta ejecutoria, which was often the single most expensive item of the entire lawsuit, and the final payment to the court's reporter -at least an additional 3,000 maravedíes by Kagan's count. That the city was sentenced to reimburse Barbero was most unusual; in all other cases from Medina de Pomar, litigants had to cover their own costs. 50 The Barbero case was also short and expeditiously settled, which would have placed it on the cheap end of the spectrum.
So what was the rate of return on ennoblement if only the resulting tax exemption is considered?
Let's take the wealthiest taxpayers from Medina de Pomar, who paid 375 mrs. per year in direct taxes. Assume that there was no risk of losing the lawsuit (although two thirds of the wealthy residents of Medina de Pomar who filed actually lost), and that there was also no risk of the city challenging the hidalguía further down the road (which was not an unusual occurrence). Assume as well that the claimant was completely altruistic about his offspring and considered the hidalguía a perpetual stream of tax relief, and that he expected direct taxes to remain constant in real terms (when in fact their value was steadily being eroded by inflation). Finally, assume an impossibly cheap lawsuit, costing in all 5,000 mrs. (when all indications are that the cheapest lawsuits would have more than doubled that figure), and abstract from the foregone interest on the legal costs during the proceedings (which could drag on for several years). Such a setup is equivalent to a risk free perpetuity paying 375 mrs. per year in return for an initial investment of 5,000 mrs.; this would imply an annual rate of return of 7.5%, barely higher than what most Since Mr. Barbero had won it before 1554, he was not included in that year's special levy, and so we don't know in what particular tax bracket he would have fallen.
relatively safe loans and bonds paid at the time. 51 With less extreme assumptions, it becomes impossible to justify the cost of a ennoblement relying on tax exemptions alone -even in those few cases in which more than one claimant was included in the same lawsuit. In a more realistic (but still quite optimistic) case assuming a cost of 12,000 mrs., a 50% chance of losing the lawsuit and no other risks or delays, the rate of return would drop to a negligible 1.5% per year.
For those whose tax assessments were not as high, the fiscal rates of return to ennoblement would have been even lower.
As discussed in the previous section, distributive litigation points to political access and the redistribution of rents as the main source of the value of ennoblement. To further buttress this argument, it is worth noting that virtually all the nobility lawsuits heard by the Sala de 
A game of litigation and redistribution.
I now use the characteristics of nobility and distributive litigation described so far to set up a simple game involving the three players that rise prominently in the archival record: the 51 A wealthy sixteenth century Castilian would have been able to use a variety of lending devices to earn interest on capital. The most popular private alternative was a form of mortgage -the censo -while, for larger sums, purchasing long term bonds from the Crown -the famed juros -was also an option. Either alternative would have provided a relatively safe return of catorce mil al millar -7.14%.
incumbent pechero political elite (I); the hidalgos that had been blocked from the town government (H); and the commoners that had also been denied access to town offices, and were now opportunistically seeking it through ennoblement (DC). I assume each player represents 1/3 of the population of the town and is neutral to risk, and normalize initial town resources to 1.
A first version of the game is presented in its extensive form in Figure 6 . I take the monarchy's centralizing drive as exogenous, and consider a starting point where hidalgos are presented with the choice to maintain the status quo or seek political power through a distributive lawsuit, demanding half of the town's offices. To abstract from the trivial case where the status quo is maintained, I assume that the legal costs of existing hidalgos are small in relation to the expected payoff from legal action, and hence they will always choose to litigate. I also assume away the tax exemption motive for seeking ennoblement; adding it does not qualitatively alter the results and only complicates the algebra.
Incumbents then face the choice of whether to oppose the hidalgos' bid for half the offices or accommodate it. If incumbents fight, hence giving rise to a distributive lawsuit, a share 1-a of the town's wealth is lost in litigation. Incumbents win the lawsuit with an exogenous probability 1-p, and lose it with probability p. If incumbents win, the game ends with a payoff equal to zero for hidalgos and disenfranchised commoners and equal to a for incumbents.
If incumbents lose a distributive lawsuit, or if they choose not to fight the hidalgos' demand for half the offices, access to offices is opened to the nobles; at this point, disenfranchised commoners can attempt to gain a share of political power by filing nobility lawsuits, which entail a private cost k. If they do not seek ennoblement, they can only receive a share of the town's wealth if the incumbents seek ennoblement themselves, thus leaving formerly disenfranchised commoners as the only candidates to fill the offices allotted to pecheros. Such a strategy is always dominated for incumbents, and hence in the equilibrium of this subgame disenfranchised commoners receive a payoff of zero if they do not file for hidalguía.
If disenfranchised commoners seek ennoblement (which they will as long as the expected payoff of doing so is nonnegative) the town needs to decide whether to fight or accommodate those claims. Since hidalgos have now succeeded in claiming half of the offices, the question of who gets to decide for the town arises. The game in Figure 6 assumes that incumbents still get to decide whether to litigate. The version in Figure 7 solves the alternative problem, where the decision rests with the hidalgos. In practice, either player could be in control of the town's legal policy at any given time; political manoeuvring, the particular implementation of mitad de los oficios in the town, and even the luck of the draw (for in some towns such was the system to allocate offices) could determine who would be in charge of legal policy.
Assume first that incumbent pecheros are still in charge of deciding whether to fight a bid for ennoblement from the disenfranchised commoners (the situation pictured in Figure 6 ). If they choose to oppose the bid, the legal expenses of the town amount to a share 1-g of the remainder of the town's wealth. Litigation has the effect of preventing a share 1-b of the disenfranchised commoners from achieving ennoblement; the remaining share b of disenfranchised commoners go on to join the ranks of hidalgos, and claim a share of offices allocated to nobles equal to their participation in the noble population. If the town chooses not to fight the bid for ennoblement, then all the disenfranchised commoners become hidalgos. Finally, incumbents can choose to seek ennoblement themselves, a bid that would go unopposed (since they control legal policy) but would force them to share the offices of hidalgos, making it a strictly dominated strategy.
Once the distributive and nobility lawsuits are settled, the remaining town resources are distributed in proportion to the number of offices held by each player. 
Italicized expressions below equilibria are the parameter values supporting them. Figure 6 shows all the possible outcomes of the game; the payoff vectors corresponding to equilibria are circled, and the supporting parameter values appear italicized beneath them. The first key insight yielded by the game is that, if the power to decide over the town's involvement in nobility litigation still rests with the incumbent pecheros, claims of hidalguía from disenfranchised commoners will not be opposed; their ennoblement only dilutes the ranks of hidalgos without altering the share of offices available to incumbents, and active litigation would only reduce the resources available for distribution. There would still be nobility lawsuits, for they remain the only gateway for commoners to become noble, but the town would not be actively fighting them, and most claimants should obtain ejecutorias. The game also shows that incumbents would fight a distributive lawsuit only if the amount of resources needed to litigate was not too high, or if the probability of losing was not too elevated; otherwise, incumbents would be better off by accommodating the demands of hidalgos and sharing power. This version of the game suggests that the only deadweight losses should come from distributive litigation, and only when the cities anticipated a high probability of winning coupled with limited legal expenses. As distributive lawsuits became more expensive and courts sided consistently with hidalgos (thereby increasing p), beliefs about both costs and chances of success would have been updated by the incumbents, distributive litigation would have gradually moved off the equilibrium path, and resources would have been redistributed without any recourse to the Royal Chancery Court. These results suggest, then, that the rent seeking activity captured by the archival record is only a lower bound for the level of redistribution in Early Modern Castile.
The outcome is slightly different if the decision on whether to fight ennoblement rests with hidalgos, who would in principle oppose newcomers into their ranks, as they would compete for the same number of offices and hence reduce the share of resources accruing to existing nobles. Strategies where incumbents choose ennoblement are strictly dominated; for simplicity, they are not shown in this tree.
Italicized expressions below equilibria are the parameter values supporting them. Under the new assumption, equilibria with and without both distributive and nobility litigation become possible. Incumbents will still fight hidalgos' demands for half the offices if the costs are not too high and the chances of success reasonable, and disenfranchised commoners will still seek ennoblement as long as the expected payoffs of doing so do not become negative. But hidalgos, now in control of the town's legal policy, will find it optimal to oppose the nobility claimants to win their lawsuits, obtain ejecutorias and become hidalgos, concentrating only on fighting those they thought could put a serious dent in their tax base. Such connivance between authorities and pecheros seeking ennoblement was in fact commonplace in the sixteenth century. 52 As hidalgos cemented their power in the town councils, however, the situation would have turn to the one described in Game II; claims of nobility would have been more vividly opposed by towns, increasing the cost of becoming noble and eventually turning the expected payoffs of disenfranchised commoners negative, thus putting a stop to nobility litigation.
Additional factors combined to reduce the number of nobility lawsuits by the end of the sixteenth century. The marked increase in the number of hidalgos had become a concern for the Crown, which in 1593 intervened by adding a number of costly and time consuming hurdles to successfully complete a lawsuit of hidalguía, further reducing their expected payoffs. 53 Direct taxes had also remained frozen in nominal terms since 1539 in the face of widespread inflation, while the bulk of the fiscal burden had gradually shifted to sales and excise taxes, from which hidalgos were not exempt. With the costs of obtaining an hidalguía on the rise and its benefits constantly eroded, ennoblement ceased to be an attractive proposition. The fall in litigation, however, did not bring about the decline of hidalguía as a mark of social distinction. The title of hidalgo was hereditary, and its lustre persisted well into the nineteenth century, relieved, from 1783 on, of the incompatibility with any kind of profession. 
Conclusion.
The institution of hidalguía emerged during the late Middle Ages as a product of the war against the Arab kingdoms; distinguished military service was rewarded with an honorific title, the advantages of which included tax exemptions, legal privileges and an ongoing commitment to 37 serve in times of war. The prohibition of engaging in "vile" or "mechanical" occupations, though of unclear origin, was intended to keep hidalgos well trained in the military arts.
Over time, the concept of hidalguía came under pressure from several directions. The grant of universal privileges to certain areas, such as Biscay, made it difficult for everyone to honour the technical requirements of the title. By the sixteenth century the entire peninsula was in Christian hands, all but ending the intermittent episodes of small-scale warfare to which hidalgos had been normally summoned, and the rapid changes in military technology required the creation of armies with an increasing degree of time commitment and professionalism. 55 While hidalguías were sometimes used to reward special favours or monetary contributions, most notably by Henry IV Trastámara (r. 1454-1474), the Catholic Kings (r. 1474-1516) revoked most of the privileges granted in such fashion, and the institution seemed headed towards an opaque decline.
The revival and unprecedented expansion of hidalguía during the sixteenth century was traditionally blamed on supposedly indiscriminate sales of patents by Charles V and Philip II; while the argument had been proved wrong by Thompson (1979) , no alternative explanation had surfaced to replace it. Using legal cases argued before the Valladolid Royal Chancery Court, I
have further shown that tax exemptions, while a welcome bonus for an hidalgo, in most cases could not justify the time, expense and risk involved in a lawsuit of hidalguía.
The sixteenth century ushered in a renewed assertion of royal power, spearheaded by the Catholic Kings and consolidated under Charles V and Philip II. As a result, towns that had previously met royal tax obligations from their commons revenue were increasingly forced to tax their commoners directly to safeguard hidalgo privileges; hidalgos soon reclaimed their right of half of the offices of the towns, backed by the Royal Chancery Courts when needed.
55 On Spain's role in pioneering the military revolution of the sixteenth century see Parker (1976) .
In the cases where litigation flared, the conflict over local control depleted the resources of the towns, which were spent fighting nobility and distributive lawsuits. Despite legal strategies aimed to keep the richest (and possibly most powerful) neighbours in the tax rolls, towns could not hope to defend the dozens of lawsuits that piled up against them over the year. As suggested by the theoretical framework and several pieces of evidence, many of them must have chosen not to fight, their ruling elites reluctantly consenting to a redistribution of resources for the sake of avoiding an even larger reduction in both their own personal income and in the town's wealth.
The archival record is silent on the efficiency implications of the redistribution; there is nothing to indicate that hidalgos would have made better or worse administrators of town property or, in the case they embezzled or appropriated public resources, that they would have diverted them from their most productive use. There is also little support for the "treason of the bourgeoisie" hypothesis; while hidalgos took pride in their title and ostensibly complied with all its requirements, I have been unable to find a single piece of evidence of hidalgos being stripped of their privileges for engaging in banned professions. Quite to the contrary, several documents casually mention hidalgos freely engaging in "mechanical and vile" activities throughout Spain; of course, in the areas that enjoyed universal hidalguía, such occurrences were almost a tautology.
The number of hidalgos did in fact grow substantially during the sixteenth century. By 1600 at least 6,221 ejecutorias had been issued for Northern Castile alone, each representing the start of a new hidalgo lineage or the confirmation of one whose purity had been challenged. Since ejecutorias do not include self-avowed hidalgos that were not challenged or whose lawsuits were dropped by the towns, they represent just a lower bound on the number of families that established themselves as part of the petty nobility. The rest of the traditional wisdom regarding hidalgos, though, needs to be thoroughly reexamined. Tax incentives seem to have had little to do with ennoblement; distributive conflict, often dismissed as inconsequential, played an important role; and although the misallocation of talent argument holds some appeal, no arcival evidence is available to support it. Finally, while substantial redistribution certainly took place at the local level, and some localities suffered large losses through litigation, these processes seem unlikely candidates for having precipitated or contributed in large measure to the decline of Spain in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
